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Respondent Stephen G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley & 
Reading (hereinafter "Morgan"), hereby responds to 
Appellants' Petition for Rehearing: 
ARGOMENT 
POINT I 
THIS CODRT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
PROBATE HEARING WAS CONDOCTED IN A 
JURIS PRUDENTIAL MANNER 
The Appellants (hereinafter "the Atkinsons") claimf that 
Judge Fishier did not properly perform his duties in 
approving the settlement agreement, is without merit. The 
Atkinsons provide no proposal as to what they claim Judge 
Fishier should have done. Having reviewed the settlement 
agreement/ the pleadings and documents submitted to him, and 
having questioned the Atkinsons, Judge Fishier made a proper 
judicial determination that the rights of the minor child 
were adequately protected and in fact, ordered the Atkinsons 
to post a bond to ensure that the minor child would be 
fairly treated. 
The Atkinsons1 claim of judicial misconduct against 
Judge Fishier is without merit. 
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POINT II 
THIS COURT DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING SOMMARY 
JUDGMENT GRANTED TO MORGAN 
The Atkinsons claim that "fact issues abound" as to 
whether or not Morgan was their lawyer• However, the so 
called disputed "facts" have been considered both by the 
trial court and by this Supreme Court and found to be 
insufficient to create a "genuine controversy" 
See Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 69 P.2d 1390 (Utah 
1980). 
The only "facts" presented by the Atkinsons is the 
continued claim that they understood Morgan to be their 
lawyer. As has been previously shown in Morgan's 
Respondents1 Brief, during oral argument, and by the opinion 
of this court, such a claim by the Atkinsons flies in the 
face of all the facts and evidence to the contrary. 
Further, the Atkinsons admit that they were not 
represented by Morgan in their Petition for Rehearing 
stating : 
...the trial court judge relied upon 
the evaluation of a 19-year old 
boy...and his 16 year old wife. 
(Both of whom were unrepresented by 
counsel.) (emphasis added) 
(Petition for Rehearing, p. 3). 
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This respondent respectfully submits that should this 
court allow the Atkinsons' claim of malpractice against 
Morgan to proceed, it would be difficult if not impossible 
for an attorney in Utah to safely deal with a pro se 
opposing party without the danger of facing the same claims 
that the Atkinsons are making. 
The crux of the Atkinsons1 request to this court is to 
find that all a disgruntled pro se party has to do is to 
assert, "we thought he was our lawyer", and regardless of 
how illogical such a claim would be under the circumstances, 
and no matter if all the evidence is to the contrary, such a 
claim should nevertheless go to a jury. 
It is a fact of legal practice that lawyers must, at 
times, deal with pro se parties. This will, as occurred 
herein, require meetings with a pro se party, reviewing 
documents with a pro se party, and appearing in court at the 
same time as a pro se party. These actions do not create a 
"lawyer-client" relationship. 
As to the case law cited in connection with the 
Atkinsons1 constitutional claims, the citations are not 
relevant for the reason that there are no material facts 
that are in dispute or genuinely controverted. Further, the 
Atkinsons1 constitutional claims are raised for the first 
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time in this Petition for Rehearing and thus, even if they 
had merit, are raised untimely. 
A 
THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF 
FACT IN DISPUTE 
The Atkinsons1 claim to provide this court with 
"evidence" of disputed issues. However, the Atkinsons cite 
only the same statements the Atkinsons made after filing 
suitf to the effect that they understood Morgan to be their 
lawyer, which statements are directly contrary to the 
evidence. 
This court held in Thornock v. Cooky 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 
1979) that a defendant cannot rely merely upon her 
allegations to avoid summary judgment but must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. This the Atkinsons have failed to do. 
Further, it is important to note that even if a genuine 
fact issue existed as to whether or not Morgan was the 
Atkinsons1 lawyer, summary judgment was still correctly 
granted by the trial court because the Atkinsons failed to 
provide any evidence by expert testimony or otherwise that 
any action on the part of Morgan violated the applicable 
standard of care. Also, there is no testimony or evidence 
in the record, expert or otherwise, on the issue of 
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causation. There is no causation between the actions of 
Morgan and the alleged damages of the Atkinsons. The only 
damages claimed are the "inadequate settlement", and the 
terms and conditions of the settlement were agreed upon by 
the Atkinsons and I.H.C. prior to the time of Morgan's 
involvement. 
In Abdul Kadir v. Western Pacific Railroad, 7 Utah 2d 53 
318 P.2d 339 (Utah 1957) this court held: 
We are in accord with the idea that 
the right of trial by jury should be 
scrupulously safeguarded. This of 
course does not go so far as to 
require the submission to a jury of 
issues of fact merely because they 
are disputed. If they would not 
establish a basis upon which 
plaintiff could recover, no matter 
how they were resolved, it would be 
useless to consume time, effort, and 
expense in trying them, the saving 
of which is the very purpose of 
summary judgment procedure. 
318 P.2d at 341. 
The Atkinsons' request for a rehearing based on disputed 
"facts" is without merit and should be denied. 
B 
THE ATKINSONS RELIED ON THEIR OWN JUDGMENT 
AS TO THE FAIRNESS OF THE SETTLEMENT, 
The Atkinsons claim that they relied on the judgment of 
Judge Fishier as to the fairness of the settlement and 
thereforef take issue with this court's opinion that they 
Atkinsons did not rely on the probate judge. 
It should first be noted that the Atkinsons1 argument 
presupposes that Judge Fishier was in error and that the 
settlement agreement was inadequate or unfair. There is 
nothing in the record to support such a supposition. The 
basis of the settlement agreement was that the Atkinsons' 
child was injured while in the care of a hospital operated 
by I.H.C. A dispute existed as to whether or not the injury 
was caused by any negligence of the hospital or health care 
providers. To resolve this dispute, negotiations took place 
between I.H.C. and the Atkinsons. The Atkinsons were 
assisted in their negotiations by George Atkinson, a union 
negotiator at Kennecott. In response to a settlement 
proposal prepared by I.H.C./ George Atkinson prepared a 
sophisticated ten page counterproposal. Eventually a 
settlement was reached which was considered fair and 
adequate by all the parties. (R. 156, 269-270, 651, pp. 20-
26, R. 644, p. 115). 
Judge Fishier carefully reviewed the documents, 
questioned the Atkinsons and thereafter approved the 
settlement. 
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The Atkinsons1 statements as to the reliance on the 
findings of Judge Fishier as a basis for granting a 
rehearing is without merit. 
C 
The Atkinsons1 arguments as to whether or not they were 
mislead about the settlement addresses matters involving 
I.H.C. and not this respondent. 
D 
MORGAN DID NOT PROVIDE "LEGAL ADVICEw 
TO THE ATKINSONS 
This court correctly stated that "Morgan's explanation 
of the probate proceedings, when viewed in the concept of 
this case, did not constitute the rendering of legal 
advice." 
Morgan was retained by I.H.C. to prepare the relevant 
settlement documents on behalf of I.H.C. to present to the 
probate court. If the Atkinsons had chosen to obtain 
counsel, Morgan would have met with opposing counsel to 
review the documents and to ensure their approval by the 
opposing party, and would have appeared in court with 
opposing counsel. However, the Atkinsons did not have an 
attorney and Morgan had no choice but to meet with them to 
review the relevant documents and appear at the same time as 
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the Atkinsons before the probate judge. These actions did 
not make Morgan the Atkinsons1 lawyer and does not 
constitute the provision of "legal advice". Morgan merely 
made statements of fact as to what the documents were and 
the fact that court approval was necessary. 
The Atkinsons claim that a "jury may infer that the 
Atkinsons thought they were getting legal advice." 
(Petition for Rehearing, p. 15). These speculations do not 
change the facts. The Atkinsons1 arguments as to Morgan 
rendering "legal advice" are without merit and should be 
rejected. 
E 
THE ATKINSONS CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY 
AND CHOSE NOT TO OBTAIN LEGAL COUNSEL 
The Atkinsons take issue with the court's findings that 
"the Atkinsons...apparently did discuss a settlement with an 
attorney of their choosing." However, the Atkinsons 
admitted the same to Judge Fishier in open court: 
THE COURT: And your name, Sir? 
MR. ATKINSON: Roger W. Atkinson. 
THE COURT: Have you sought the 
advice of legal counsel in this 
matter? 
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MRS. ATKINSON: I have talked with 
someone about it but we are not 
planning on getting a lawyer, 
THE COURT: Have you talked to a 
lawyer? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, I have just 
asked him a few things about it, and 
he said we really should not — we 
shouldn't have to sue them if they 
are giving us an offer. 
As this court correctly stated in its opinion, the 
above-cited statements clearly show that the Atkinsons did 
not consider Morgan to be their lawyer, that these 
statements do not refer to Morgan and that the Atkinsons had 
consulted with an attorney and decided not to retain an 
attorney on the advice of that lawyer, (who presumably told 
them that they wouldn't have to sue if they are being given 
an offer). 
Morgan, in discussing this statement of Mrs. Atkinson 
testified in his deposition: 
A: ...I assume by that statement 
she had talked to another 
lawyer because I never made 
that statement to her. 
Q: Did you ever ask Mrs. Atkinson 
what she meant by that 
statement which you just read 
to me? 
A: No. 
Q: And you say that you never told 
her that she shouldn't sue them 
because they made an offer? 
-9-
A: Absolutely not. That is a ri-
diculous statement. 
(R. 652, pp. 45-46). 
The Atkinsons now claiming that they were referring to 
Morgan when making these statements concerning a lawyer, 
flies in the face of logic and makes no sense under the 
circumstances. The Atkinsons' attempts to explain away the 
obvious are without merit and do not constitute sufficient 
reason to grant their Petition for Rehearing. 
POINT III 
MORGAN DID NOT HAVE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
The Atkinsons1 statement in their Petition for Rehearing 
that: "even if there was no attorney/client relationship, 
Morgan still had a duty to advise the Atkinsons of his 
conflict of interest" is a paradox. As has been previously 
briefed, no attorney/client relationship existed between the 
Atkinsons and Morgan. The Atkinsons1 claim of a "conflict 
of interest" is solely based on the following statements by 
Roger Atkinson: 
Q: You didn't ever ask him [Morgan] 
if this is a good or bad deal isn't 
that true? 
A: I think not. I think I did ask 
him that. 
Q: What did he say? 
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A :
 I don't recall. I think he 
asked us back If we thought it 
was fair. (emphasis added) 
(R. 644, pp. 118-119). 
First, Mr. Atkinson was not certain that the 
conversation ever took place. He also did not recall what 
Morganfs response was but merely stated that he "thought" 
Morgan asked the Atkinsons if they thought it was fair. 
Even if the conversation took place as the Atkinsons 
"thought", it may have taken place, the Atkinsons admit that 
Morgan did not provide any opinion on the fairness of the 
settlement. In fact, Morgan could not have given such an 
opinion since he was at no time aware of the details of the 
injuries or the negotiations that resulted in the 
settlement. Morgan had no basis upon which to evaluate or 
judge the fairness of the settlement nor was it his duty to 
do so. 
The Atkinsons' reliance on an affidavit of Richard 
Henriksen is also misplaced. The affidavit in question was 
not timely and properly filed, and did not specifically 
address the matters at issue. The affidavit merely dealt in 
generalities and hypotheticals, none of which applied to or 
referred to Morgan or the factual issues before the trial 
court. 
-11-
Morgan did not have a conflict of interest. Morgan was 
at no time the Atkinsons' attorney nor did he at any time 
offer legal advice to the Atkinsons or provide an opinion as 
to the adequacy or fairness of the settlement. 
Finally, under the circumstances it would have made no 
sense for Morgan to advise the Atkinsons to obtain counsel. 
It was clear by the facts presented to Morgan, that they had 
chosen not to do so. For the Atkinsons to allege in their 
Petition for Rehearing that "if Morgan had advised the 
Atkinsons to obtain an independent attorney, there would 
have been another ending to this story" is without merit 
and should be rejected as a basis for granting the Petition 
for Rehearing. 
POINT IV 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD KING IS IMPROPER 
Finally, it should be noted that the Affidavit of 
Richard King filed in support of the Petition for Rehearing 
is improper. The Affidavit attempts to raise issues, not 
only for the first time on Appeal, but for the first time on 
Petition for Rehearing. Further, the Affidavit does not 
provide relevant or useful information. What Dr. King 
appears to be saying is that the Atkinsons have found 
themselves trying to explain away previous statements, such 
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as their statements before Judge Fishierf in an attempt to 
fit the claims they are now making against Morgan, and that 
after reviewing the inconsistent and illogical explanations 
of the Atkinsons, Dr. King has reached the conclusion that 
perhaps they were or perhaps they were not telling the 
truth. 
Furthermore, this Affidavit is based on assumptions and 
suppositions made by Dr. King. Finally, if this Affidavit 
is viewed in whole or in part as an attempt by Dr. King, a 
psychologist, to testify as to the standard of care or of 
the actions of Morgan in the field of law, to that extent 
the Affidavit is further improper and inadmissible pursuant 
to this court's holding in Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 
245 (Utah 1985). The Affidavit of Richard King should be 
rejected as a basis for granting the Petition for Rehearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Morgan was retained by I.H.C. to provide legal services 
to I.H.C. specifically to draft documents in connection with 
a settlement agreement and present them to the probate court 
for approval. No attorney/client relationship existed at 
any time between Morgan and the Atkinsons, either express or 
implied. Morgan did not provide any legal services or give 
legal advice as a volunteer or otherwise to the Atkinsons. 
All of Morgan's legal services were performed for the 
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benefit and on behalf of I.H.C. as reflected on all of the 
pleadings and documents. 
Judge Fishier verified with the Atkinsons that they were 
not represented by counsel, that they had consulted with an 
attorney, not Morgan, and had chosen not to obtain 
counsel. Judge Fishier acted properly in approving the 
settlement. At no time has there been any evidence that the 
settlement was inadequate. 
The Atkinsons have utterly failed to show the existence 
of any of the required elements of a legal malpractice 
claim. Even if a question of fact did exist as to whether 
or not Morgan was their lawyer, at no time has there been 
any evidence presented by expert testimony or otherwise that 
Morgan acted below the standard of care. The settlement 
agreement which is the subject of this lawsuit was 
completely agreed upon by the Atkinsons and I.H.C. prior to 
Morgan's involvement. There is no causation between any act 
of Morgan and the only claim of damages by the Atkinsons, 
specifically the terms of the settlement agreement. 
The Atkinsons1 Petition for Rehearing is without merit 
and this respondent respectfully requests that the same be 
denied. 
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